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*  *  *  *  *
P R O C E E D I N G S
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Welcome.  I am very excited to see so many
interested people, so many knowledgeable people and, as others have
already noted, so many people with diverse opinions about these topics.
The only tragedy is that we have so many experts and so little time.  And
so, my role here is to be the ultimate taskmaster and keep us on target.
With that effort in mind, what I would like to do is, regrettably, skip
the introductions of our panelists.  Everyone has materials that include
the biographies of our panelists.  I really would like to encourage
everyone to have a look at those materials, because we have a
tremendously distinguished panel.  Also in effort to keep us on target, I
would like to pose some broad questions to each of the panels and
move down the panel asking each panelist to restrict themselves to
about three to five minutes to answer the broad question, subparts of
the question, or even other questions they may think are related to my
question.
The other thing I would like to mention to the audience is that we
will try to reserve some time at the end of each panel for your
questions.  We think it may be more efficient if you write your
questions as they occur to you during the panels and then send them
forward.  The Law Review has left some papers at the end of your rows
and you may either bring them up yourselves or motion and Law
Review staff members will bring them to me.
The first panel today is called “The Road to Napster,” and, in a sense,
the road to Napster begins, possibly, with the invention of the printing
press, but most certainly with the invention of player piano roles, as
Bruce Lehman has mentioned.  That is, this story is about the
development of technology and content owners’ response to the
development of technology.  This response has always been to regard
new technology because many of these developments, be it radio or
VCRs, have allowed a certain amount of copying.  Traditionally, content
owners have gone either to the courts or the legislatures, but basically to
the law, and asked for some protection.  So, the question that I would
like to get at today is:  What is the proper role of law?  What should the
relationship between law and technological development be?
I also would appreciate if the panelists could give us a little bit of the
background story of the Napster dispute.1  The story behind the music

1. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136 at 1 (N.D. Cal. May
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or, I guess, in this case, the story behind the music distribution.  How
did this development of technology and the development of the music
industry’s distribution model result in this kind of confrontation,
where, in a sense, each side was saying to the court the same thing:  “if
you listen to them, and if you do what they tell you to do, we will be
destroyed?”  Either this technology will be stifled, Napster’s version, or
the music industry as we know it will not survive, the RIAA’s version.
So, please address these larger points:  the role of law, the
development of the technology and the story behind this dispute.  Why
not start with you, Michael Madison?
PROFESSOR MADISON:  All right.  Let me start by introducing one
concept that Professor Farley did not mention which is also a very
important part of the equation here:  the idea of norms or customs of
using and producing works protected by copyright.  Copyright is about
the public domain and creating and preserving the public domain.
Obviously, this goal exists in tension with the idea of private property
rights.  This tension gets balanced or resolved in the interplay between
technology, its limits, and law, which to some extent can manage
technology, and the idea of social norms.
Most technologies have legitimate uses as well as illegitimate uses.
The law can travel a certain distance down the road to protect against
illegitimate uses, but in the gaps, we rely on social norms.  Community
customs of fairness and appropriate behavior help us resolve and limit
perceptions that there are overly expansive uses of public material that
should be protected by private property rights.2  Expression of social
norms in copyright law is manifested in the fair use doctrine,3 which
dictates that we should be deciding on a case-by-case basis what is fair
and what is unfair.  We should be deciding on a case-by-case basis what
those norms should be and how those norms should be protected or
channeled in a different direction.
Every new technology that comes along challenges our
understanding of existing social norms, and I think a big part of
what’s going on in this litigation with Napster and other

12, 2000).
2. Lawrence Lessig has described this phenomenon in some detail.  See
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501 (1999).  On the power of litigation to shape social norms in copyright, see
Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware, Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1025 (1998).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 Supp. 2000) (codifying the “fair use” affirmative
defense); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (discussing, inter
alia, parody and fair use); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985) (interpreting the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act vis-à-vis the First
Amendment).
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Internet-related technologies is a fight over social norms; a fight over
appropriate behavior.  What content providers and the recording
industry, in the Napster litigation in particular, are trying to do is to
shape a popular perception through litigation.  This authorized use is
illegal in public.  For example, if you look at Judge Patel’s order in
the Napster litigation, she enjoins unauthorized uploading or
downloading of recorded music.  She does not enjoin uploading or
downloading of infringing music.  Resolution of conflicts over norms
requires that there should be parties with different perspectives about
what those norms should be.
The last thing that I would like to say in this context is that I am
very grateful to the counsel for Metallica, who filed a lawsuit that
named Yale, University of Southern California and Indiana University
as defendants and, in fact, accused them not only of being copyright
infringers, but also racketeers in an effort to have those colleges and
universities shut down student access to Napster.  Unfortunately, Yale
right away agreed to the demand and shut down access to Napster.
However, the other two universities did not.  Additional demand letters
have been sent out to other colleges and universities requesting that
they terminate access to Napster.  A number of those universities also
reject the demand and stand up in their particular cases for principles
of academic freedom, free exchange of information, and principles that
are closely related to the idea of the public domain.
I think the bottom line is that lawyering matters.  It matters how a
particular court rules, who the particular lawyers are, what arguments
are presented, and who the defendants are.  In this context it is useful
not only to have the interest of private property claims presented on the
plaintiff’s side, but also to have defendants and potential defendants
taking a stand from their own self-interest perspective that the public
domain matters.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  Next, George Borkowski.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  I am glad that you said that lawyering matters.  I
certainly agree as one of the lawyers representing the Recording
Industry against Napster.  I think there has been terrific lawyering on
both sides of this case.  I cannot let my remarks begin without saying
something about Florida, because I was speaking to counsel for Napster
beforehand and we kind of feel like the Bush and Gore campaigns,
waiting for the ultimate result.
The Ninth Circuit has not ruled as of this time on Judge Patel’s
injunction and it has now exceeded everybody’s predictions as to when
it would do so.  This symposium would have been more interesting had
the Court ruled a couple days ago, but I still think it is going to be very
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interesting.
I am glad that Professor Farley mentioned the printing press, because
the printing press is an early technological innovation that sparked the
creation of copyright law.  There was no concrete concept of copyright
before that time as there was no need for it.  As technology developed
to enable efficient and relatively fast copying, a need for laws protecting
the content owner and the creator developed.  This has not changed in
the hundreds of years since Gutenberg.  I think that the Napster
litigation that I’m a part of, the MP3.com litigation that was brought,
and apparently has now been fully settled by the recording industry,
and the most recent suit brought by the Business Software Alliance
against software piracy and those who are pirating software and selling
pirated software over the Internet, have the potential to result in good
outcomes for both sides of the equation—or I should say all sides,
because there are more than just two sides to this equation.
I think these lawsuits and debates, like the one we are having now,
serve a very useful educational purpose.  They send a message to
those who think only of the technology side that they also need to
take into account copyright law and that the rights of the copyright
owners, the content owners, as well as of the creative community,
have to be respected as technology develops.  Indeed, the primary
purpose of copyright law in this country—which, as lawyers, law
students, and professors we all know is a concept that comes from the
Constitution—is essentially to foster creativity.  This is why content
owners are given a limited monopoly for a period of time.
Intellectual property also has become, at least from the United States’
perspective, one of the underpinnings of its economy, a significant
part of the gross national product of this country—or gross domestic
product, as we now call it.  This value is at risk if intellectual property
rights get trampled by a myopic and extreme view of technology.  All
other legitimate industries that use creative content have to, and do,
respect copyright law and there is no reason why the technology
community should be exempt from playing by the same rules.
I think that this debate and those litigations, though, will allow us
to move towards the creation of a model for licensing content for
digital distribution.  A model for licensing content over the Internet
that can, if everybody works hard at it, result in—not to use horrible
business jargon—a “win-win” situation for everybody involved, if we
do it right.
I think we have the opportunity to strengthen copyright law within
the context of developing technology as evidenced throughout history
from, as I mentioned, the time of the printing press.  I was just talking
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with one of the later panelists, for example, about photocopiers and
about the dislocations that they caused initially.
What we are debating is also a question of social norms.  I think that
technology is neutral and that our values are reflected in the way we use
our technology.  You can point to examples anywhere from the debate
about dropping the bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the current
discussion of how we use technology and intellectual property vis-a-vis
the Internet.
I think that the goal should be—and what the recording industry’s
goal has been in the Napster case—is not to prevent a technology, not
to shut down a company, but to encourage the use of technology that
could be beneficial in a way that is not illegitimate and in a way that
protects content owners and the creative community.
If technology companies work with the content owners, I believe both
will benefit.  I think the technology companies will benefit, because as
they grow—and we are seeing this now—they will need the protection
of copyright law.  Napster itself has filed for patents for its technology,
or more accurately for those aspects of its technology that it claims are
new.  Napster has trademarks that it protects, it has copyrights in its
software programs and otherwise that it protects.
Napster understands that copyright law is important, and I think that
if both the technology and the creative communities can come together
on this, much more positive will be achieved than through the blunt
object of litigation.  Through cooperation, content can be enhanced,
creativity can be enhanced, and the development of technology can be
enhanced to the benefit of all.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  And now, Declan McCullagh.
MR. MCCULLAGH:  Hi, thanks for having me.  I come at this from
the perspective of an author and writer—someone who produces
content.  Wired is now owned by Lycos now owned by Terra, so we’re
part of Terra Lycos, one of the largest companies, and get a large
percentage of our revenues from content.
This is something that I like in theory, but am afraid that the news I
have for my fellow panelists, or at least some of them, is not good.
There is Moore’s law, that, at least the geeks among you are familiar
with.  Something like the raw computing power measured in terms of
microprocessor speed will double roughly every eighteen months.  This
has held true since the early ‘70s and it is a very, very cool benchmark
or rule-of-thumb for predicting what is going to happen.  It might cause
some problems in the future, but for right now we have this.
Now, let me offer McCullagh’s law:  As bandwidth falls in price, and
as the number of users sharing a network increases, the price of
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intellectual-property approaches zero.  We see this in a very interesting
new technology that is one of the sort of post-Napster applications.
What the system is, is called Mojo Nation, instead of just allowing
people to transfer files, it encourages transactions.
Now this is a company that has been created in the last few months by
a bunch of renegade libertarian cyberpunks who are more than happy
to end the idea of intellectual property as we know it, and they might.
While it is distributed, unlike Napster, it is not as easy to use as Napster
yet, but most importantly, it allows transactions.
We are moving from a transfer model, where you have the tragedy of
the commons.  Economics do not play a role in a transaction model
which encourages by letting people who have content, in other words,
pirated content, charge for downloads.
So, what this means is if I have a copy of, say, a copyrighted work, I
can put this on the Mojo Nation network and get revenue as people
download it, even if I am not the original owner of that content, and
based on the design of it, this is an area where technology has outpaced
law.
It is going to be very difficult for content owners to technologically
shut this down.  The Mojo Nation owners and founders believe it is
going to be very difficult for them to legally shut it down, as well.  They
understand the dynamic and they have structured the company in such
a way that it is going to be very difficult, they think, and their backers
think, to shut it down.  So, it is not just Napster we have to talk about, it
is what is beyond a Napster.
Finally, a technology may be neutral, but when it comes to social
change, it is not.  It has revolutionized the world, and I think this is
going to mean new ways to think about intellectual property.  Instead of
getting paid after you write it by advertising or by subscription, we
might have to move to a different model.  I’m a capitalist, I’m a free
marketeer and I believe that if people want something, the free market
is going to provide it, even in the absence of law.  So what this might
mean is, instead of me getting paid as an artist, say, Prince, $10 million
after I release an album through the relatively inefficient $10 and $15
CD sales, what I might do is say to my loyal fans, look, I, you want me to
do this album, this is my cost, contribute toward it.  This is what we have
seen.  So, unless I get $10 million in contributions, and there are free
rider problems, this is not, some people are not going to contribute and
enjoy it anyway, but what this will do is move us toward a prepayment
model, so once Prince gets the $10 million he’ll release it and everyone
can download the music for free.  I’ll shut up now and turn it over to
the next panelist.
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PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank You. Peter Schalestock.
MR. SCHALESTOCK:  Dean Pike mentioned in his introduction
that with each generation, we seem to have some new technology that
comes out that poses a threat to copyright law.  There has been a
continuing succession of these:  the photocopy machine, the
videocassette recorder, and the digital audio tape.
What we have moved into with Napster is a technology.  While part of
that is progression, it is in some ways fundamentally different, because it
does not just merely threaten copyright, it threatens to destroy it in
certain works.  Declan was hinting at some of that.  These other
technologies certainly allowed copying on a large scale relatively
cheaply, but are different in that you do not get a bound volume out of
a copy machine and you do not get a perfect copy on a videocassette
recorder.  It takes time to produce the copies, I mean, there’s definitely
some overhead there.  Napster has taken away most of that:  you get
perfect copies almost instantly, and as many of them as you want.  It has
created a higher degree of tension than a lot of these technologies have
in the past.
At the same time, in terms of the law adapting to these technologies
or trying to build a relationship between them, the technology now is
moving much, much faster than the law can possibly keep up with.  For
instance, I happened to have the privilege of working on Capitol Hill
during the consideration of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.4  We
were not talking about anything like Napster at that time; it was not
something that was on the radar screen as recently as two years ago.
Now it is the major issue.  If Congress were to sit down today and try to
rewrite the copyright law in a way that accommodated Napster, by the
time they finished, there would be something else out there that no one
had thought of yet.
The same problem exists with the courts.  As you know, the Ninth
Circuit has taken a fairly long time to come to a decision.  Presumably,
when they do, it will go to the Supreme Court and take even longer.  By
the time this issue may be resolved, the technology will have changed
again.  Therefore, it does create some real problems, and we see
illustrations of this in the Napster litigation where there are two statutes
that are being vigorously litigated in this case, the Audio Home
Recording Act5 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, either one of
which Napster argues creates an exemption for it.

4. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct.
28, 1998).
5. 102 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).
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The other side disputes that both Act’s were written with something
in mind that was not Napster.  This really is a different technology that
is trying to be covered by old law.  We have entered an era where there
are new problems relating copyright law to the technologies that allow
its distribution.  The two sides clearly need each other and the
MP3.com case has been settled; Napster is moving in that direction.
It may turn out that the business models will adapt and will resolve
these issues faster than the law can keep up with it, and we could find
that major issues in copyright law are, in fact, being resolved by private
contracts rather than by formal legal developments.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  Jonathan Band.
MR. BAND:  Thank you very much.  Continuing with the election
theme of some of the other speakers, I feel that Joe Lieberman’s
candidacy and, perhaps ultimate victory, since he gives me license to
wear my religion on my sleeve like he so often wears his religion on his
sleeve, and we happen to have the same religion.  In Jewish law, there is
a concept of siag la Torah, which means building a fence around the
Torah.  An example of that, and that is sort of how Jewish law has always
evolved, is in the Bible it says, “ye shall not cook a kid in its mother’s
milk and so from that sentence in the Bible, you really have the whole
structure of casch root,” which was built over the centuries by rabbis
sort of constantly building one fence after another around the core
principle.
Now, sometimes people say, well, that constant accretion of fences
around the Torah is ridiculous and leads to ridiculous results and
sometimes takes you so far away from the core principle that you really
lose the core principle.  I think there is a danger in copyright and a lot
of what we are seeing in the last few years is the same kind of pattern of
accretion; where in the center you have the basic principles of
copyright law, which are very simple about the owners’ rights, and then
some limited exceptions of fair use stock and so forth.  It is really quite
simple and straight forward.
But then, over the years, all kinds of fences have been built around
that core principle.  So, first of all, again, judges have created and have
often used this concept of contributory infringement, but certainly, I
think in some of the recent cases, contributory infringement is being
taken to extents or degrees further than we have seen before.
Moreover, copyright owners, because of the economics involved, see it
is much cheaper to go after who they say is the contributory infringer,
the person they believe is facilitating the infringement, rather than the
person who is actually doing the infringement themselves.  But then
we’ve seen even sort of an accretion on that accretion of contributory
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infringement.  So, for example, Bruce Lehman, earlier was talking
about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and so not only are we
saying that there should be technological protections, we are making it
unlawful to circumvent technological protections.
Of course, the danger, when you start building fences around the
Torah or building fences around the copyright law, is that some of the
very limitations and exceptions that are built into the copyright law get
lost.  That, of course, is the fundamental problem with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, whether the case we are going to be hearing
about later on at lunchtime is a good example or a bad example, is
debatable, but, still, there is no question that the copyright law is far
more nuanced and contains far more exceptions than the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.  The technological protections are much
more rigid than the law they are intended to protect.
Similarly, there is something else we have now, at the state level, you
see it, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.6  Basically
it enforces shrink wrap licenses and, again, is enabling.  One of the
justifications for it is when we need to protect copyrighted content in
the digital age. This is being done by contract.  But, again, copyright has
its limitations, its’ balances. However, UCITA allows the copyright
owner to impose contract terms that perhaps do not allow for fair use
and do not allow for, again, the limitations and exceptions that the
copyright law contains.
In terms of how we got here, on the road to Napster, what we see is
that there are core principles.  There has been this accretion of
additional protections justified on the basis of saying, oh, it’s the New
Age, digital technology, ease of reproduction, ease of dissemination
worldwide.  However, I think we really need to step back and say, do
those technological developments warrant this constant building of new
fences around the Torah, the new fences around the copyright law,
which will, perhaps over time, break it down and lose its essence of a
very finely tuned balance between the rights of owners and the rights of
users.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  James Laughlin.
MR. LAUGHLIN:  In this wonderful place of academic learning, it is
appropriate to dispassionately consider for a moment, really what we
are about.  Our history books are filled with discussions about people,
but they frequently ignore what the people were doing.  My premise
here this morning is to point out to you that it was the technology of

6. See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita92900.doc (last visited Dec. 22,
2000).
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the people that drove the human conduct and hence the law.
You have all been exposed a little bit to James Burke, the chronicler
of the history of technology in his series of connections and his books,
where he notes that the industries of man drove man.  As we sit and we
look at those societies through the eyes of the historian, we see that at
every change, there was a modification in the conduct of men and a
modification, which quickly followed, in the laws.
Of course, following the principles of Moore’s law, we’ve had to move
faster and faster.  Yet, I think it’s important to reflect for just a moment
on a non-technological issue in our time to see the implication.
Some of you will remember the wonderful story of Daniel Boorstin,
the Librarian of Congress, who wrote in his book Discoverers,7 about the
loadstone, the compass, and how the Church, sensing that this was an
implement of the Devil, had forbidden its use.  Thus, captains of sea
ships, who had special authority and special recognition through the
Church at the time, were not able to use this technological implement.
But the fact was that sailors understood, down at the dockside, that
the ships that went out with the Devil’s instrument came back and the
ships that did not have such an instrument, frequently did not.  The
solution, of course, was very pragmatic, the captain didn’t carry the
devilstone, but the first mate, the man who went to the hiring place to
hire the sailors, was known to carry it and, therefore, he was able to
attract a crew.  It took a long time for the Church to rethink its theories
and it’s relationships to technology. But the conduct of men quickly
changed.  Technology touches our lives everywhere.  We see it in a lot
of ways, but I was reminded that Commissioner Bruce Lehman, sat over
a patent office that exists across the river, that, since 1790, has issued
about six and a-half million patents and these patents have chronicled
the advance of technology but, more interestingly, this patent office
itself, during his time of leadership, moved into disseminating it
throughout society, using the very technologies that we’re talking about
here today.
We are moving very quickly.  The discussion, however, is not about
patents, it’s about the focus of copyright law.  In 1959, Xerox
Corporation brought forth the first photocopier, commercially.  The
so-called 914.  It weighed 2,800 pounds.  It cost $7,400, which in ‘59
terms was a lot of money.  But it did something that could not have
been done before.  It made it possible to take and reasonably, cheaply
copy that which previously had only been producible by the presses, the
hard iron.

7. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, DISCOVERERS (1983).
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No matter where the theory of copyright law comes from, the fact of
the matter is it’s broad implementation was to build fences and protect
the industry of publishing.  It was the beginning of the technology age
of the computer that started to attack that.  Because now, you and I
could print, you and I could publish.
This innovation in the technology tracked very nicely the theory that
had been being worked on for years, the theory that came about as a
part of the Copyright Act of 1976.  The idea that copyrights could
belong to authors without the work being published.  Well, as the
challenge of the Xerox machine worked through society, I think it’s fair
to say that what happened was that, while the law might have changed,
what did absolutely change was the publishing industry and the way it
dealt with the products that it had.
Now, digital technology brings content to our door, but content
requires creators.  And we’ve heard across this panel this morning the
discussion about the position that authors have and the position that
an industry has and all you’re really seeing is this traditional battle
between the owners of industrial property who make our economy go
and those individuals who create those things that we find of interest
and of value.
As we sit here today, the one word that I have not heard across this
panel this morning is the one that I believe is going to give us the most
trouble.  And that word is privacy.  Because what we are about today is
the delivering of content not en masse to a society, but to individuals as
users.
If our ability to receive content and to manipulate and work with this
content is going to be a threshold character of technology as we move
forward, the ability of the copyright law or concepts of protection of
industrial property are all going to be seen through the lens of privacy
of those of us who, within our own homes and our offices, are working
with this content.  This is a tension not often talked about and,
certainly, technology is only beginning to deal with it, but we all
understand it.
So, as I look forward to this, I appreciate McCullagh’s law.  It is
absolutely right that as the ability to receive more information goes,
the price of that information will necessarily come down, but that’s
an old economic concept anyway.  What we need to measure is the
price versus the value.  In doing so, the law that we’re talking about
will follow.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  Shubha Ghosh.
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  I want to take this full circle and also add
some of my own comments.  Professor Madison started out by
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presenting this as a question of norms, which it is.  But what makes the
Napster case particularly interesting is that it’s a question of conflicting
norms.  Professor Madison accurately described the consumer norms,
particularly those of unbundling and rebundling and the sharing of
music, which I am going to talk about.  But there are also business
norms that should be taken into consideration, specifically, the norms
associated with how the music industry has traditionally distributed
music.
Napster allows an alternative mechanism to distribute music on a very
wide scale outside the traditional retail and distribution chains.  And
that’s exactly why Napster is threatening.  I start out with this sort of
broad description of the case, because I really think a lot of these issues
are not going to be settled for a long time.  I’m not going to make any
prediction about what the Ninth Circuit is going to say, but even if we
had a complete settlement, so all the plaintiffs enter into agreements
with the lucky Mr. Fanning, there are still going to be some crucial
issues about what rights consumers, the end-user, have over the use of
music and the alternate distribution channels that the Internet permits.
The rights of consumers of music, I will state again very broadly, need
to be protected by recognizing the non-commercial use by end users as
fair use under copyright.  There are several limits within existing law to
recognizing this type of fair use, and therefore it is an ideal.  But the
quest for this ideal is what frames the following discussion of the case.
There are at least two types of uses that are raised by the Napster
case.  The first is the idea of unbundling and rebundling.  These terms
are from the field of economics, but they should be recognized as part
of legal analysis.  What are unbundling and rebundling?  The way we
traditionally get music through CDs, through movies, through
television programs, through radio, is by bundling with other content.
There may be only one track on the CD that you really like, but in order
to get the CD, you’re going to have to buy thirteen other lesser qualities
songs with it.
The bundling of music with other content is not a tie-in under
antitrust, and we can talk about that in our discussion.  The consumer
should have the right to unbundle within limits. If a consumer wants to
have only one song, there should be some mechanism for the
consumer to purchase it.  Rebundling is something we’ve all done but
may not have talked about.  If you’ve ever made your favorite hits tape,
where you have taken tracks from different CDs and created your own
mix, then you’ve rebundled.  By rebundling, you have created a
derivative work and infringed the rights of the copyright owner to
create that same new bundle.  It strikes me as odd that we can have a
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law that doesn’t allow for unbundling and rebundling when the
practices are quite common.  And, of course, that’s where fair use can
come in.
But before discussing fair use, I should address the implications of
Napster for unbundling and rebundling.  Whatever business
arrangement is struck between Bertelsmann and Napster and whatever
other types of deals that Napster might strike, unbundling and
rebundling are going to be more difficult.  Because whatever business
model is adopted, metering of uses will be possible.  The unbundled
song or the rebundled songs are items that the new business entity, will
be able to distribute commercially.  the treatment of unbundling and
rebundling as fair use is going to be preempted by how the market and
the business model develops.  But there’s one aspect of fair use that I
think is going to be very hard to preempt, and that is music sharing, or
broadly, file sharing.  Again, file sharing is something we all do.  If I
make a cassette of a CD and distribute it to a friend as a gift or what not,
I’m no doubt giving him a lesser quality, but I’m also sharing a
particular experience that I like with somebody I think would enjoy it,
as well.  The same is true if I rebundle the songs and create my own
greatest hits tape or create my own version of how the songs are
arranged.  I think file sharing is going to be very difficult to prevent and
I think there is room within existing law to recognize file sharing as fair
use, and I will discuss how this use can be recognized at the end of my
talk.  But let me make two additional points before the finale.
We have several business models for content distribution that can be
adopted for Napter.  The Napster-Bertelsmann project may look like
LEXIS or Westlaw. Both these services bundle different types of
information content, are supported by subscription fees, and
depending what kind of institution the end-user is affiliated with, grants
specific rights to the user over the content.  Napster may very well look
like this in the future.
But even in a LEXIS-Westlaw-type world, file sharing is easy.  I can
run searches for someone else.  I can download content and distribute
it to someone else.  I will admit it; I have done it.  I’m a law professor
and I have some latitude in the use of LEXIS and Westlaw. I have
friends who have hung up their own shingle, and work on largely pro-
bono projects and can’t afford LEXIS or WestLaw.  And I, as a favor to
them because they’re my friends, have downloaded content and have
done searches for them.  Sue me.
These are the types of uses out there that are not going to be
resolved regardless of the business model adopted.  Does the law
allow for this?  I think there are two obstacles within existing law that
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prevent these fair uses from being permitted.  Section 1008 of the
Copyright Act, the provision of the DMCA that allows consumers to
make essentially back-up copies of digital music, may allow for some
types of file sharing and for unbundling and rebundling content.
But that would be reading the statute too broadly and with the strict
constructionist mentality of many courts, it’s going to be hard to
protect file sharing and unbundling/rebundling under Section 1008.
Section 107, the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act, may provide
an avenue for recognizing file sharing and unbundling/rebundling.
But the current state of fair use poses difficulties.  The problem arises
from the fourth element of fair use, the effect of the use on the
potential market for the copyrighted work.  To illustrate the problem,
let me read from a portion of the MyMP3.com decision,8 where the
court is addressing the fourth element of fair use.  In this passage, the
court is addressing the argument that MyMP3 actually helps the music
industry by providing free advertising for songs and creating incentives
for people to go out and buy CD’s.  The court addresses this argument
by pointing out that, first, there is no evidence of such a positive impact
and, second, that this would be so even if the copyright owner had not
entered the new market in issue.
 “For a copyright holder’s exclusive rights derived from the
Constitution and the Copyright Act include:  The right, within broad
limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by refusing
to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms that
copyright owner finds acceptable.”9
What constitutes the market under Section 107 has expanded.  The
copyright owner’s rights do not simply apply to rights in markets that he
or she has already entered and established a foothold in, but to any
possible market, according to the MyMP3 case.  My suggestion is that
that reading has to be wrong, with all respect to the judge.  If you go
back and read the Sony case,10 the one having to do with the VCR, the
difference between the majority and the dissent is that the majority
looked at actual market effects.  They looked at the actual market in
which the movie producers operated and analyzed the effects of the
then new VCR technology on existing markets.  The dissent, on the
other hand, looked at all possible markets, not just currently existing
markets.  Where would we be now with regards to VCR use if the

8. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 WL 524808 at 1 (S.D.N.Y. May
4, 2000).
9. Id. at 3.
10. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding
that the use of video tape recorders for “time-shifting” constitutes fair use).
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dissenting opinion had managed to prevail?  With respect to Napster
and file sharing and unbundling/rebundling, the broad (and
incorrect) reading of the fourth element of Section 107 makes it
difficult for fair use to go anywhere in terms of preserving non-
commercial uses by end users.  I will end my comments on that note.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  I guess I’d like to open it up for
you all to respond to each other’s comments.  I’ll also throw another
question out.  Many of you have mentioned the recent settlements in
the MP3.com case and the Napster case, and I wonder if you think
there are any lessons to be learned from those settlements.  How do
they bear on your opinion of how the law should be responding here?
Anyone . . .
MR. BAND:  The real question is, could those settlements have been
achieved without the litigation and one way of viewing it, of course, it all
depends on your point of view.  One way of viewing is whether it was
MP3.com or Napster, they wanted to get the information for free, and
so they did that and then the RIAA knocked them around the head,
brought them in line and then they were able to work out a decent
licensing arrangement that works for both sides.
Another way of viewing it is that, and, again, I’m not privy to the
discussions and the calculations, another way of viewing it is that the
recording industry was not willing or there was a sense that the
recording industry was not willing to offer licenses on anywhere near
reasonable terms and so, in essence, sort of forced the companies, like
MP3.com, to do what they did and then you had the litigation and then
they ended up where they did.  So, it sort of depends on, it’s kind of a
chicken-and-egg question.  I guess the most important thing that it
demonstrates is that, at least in this country, litigation is part of doing
business.  It is part of the negotiation and whether that’s good or bad, I
think that is the case, it is part of the negotiation.  Sometimes the only
way to bring people to the table is to either litigate or to force the issue,
and I think the interesting thing, though, is that that’s an incredibly
socially inefficient way of doing things, but, on the other hand, look at
all these law students that need to be employed when they graduate,
and so, maybe it’s a good thing.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  It’s interesting, because it may be a question of
perspective.  Michael Robertson—this is related to your second point,
but it’s a little broader.  Michael Robertson justified MP3.com’s
settlement with Universal by saying that, well, if we hadn’t gone out and
infringed all of these sound recordings, we never would have gotten
permission from the record companies to do this at all.  So, that’s a
third take on the issue.
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But I think that regardless of which of those three, if any, is
accurate—and I’m not going to hazard a guess, because I wasn’t privy to
any of that, nor was I involved in the MP3.com litigation—what this is
doing, in my view, is moving towards a model through which you can
have digital distribution and you can have it through some of these
alternative formats but, nevertheless, it’s imposing a business model
wherein the content owners and the creative community get paid for
what’s being done.
Now, you can debate whether the current model, to the extent there
is one, needs to be further modified to take into account new
technologies; whether the current model is still too set in the older ways
of doing business and just provides a gloss for what’s going on right
now.  But I think that what the MP3.com case shows is that it is possible,
if the parties want, to come up with a business model whereby content
owners and the creative community do get paid, but where the digital
distribution formats already out there continue to be used at least to a
core extent of the way that they had been designed to be used.  Such an
approach does not hinder a new technology.
PROFESSOR MADISON:  In addition, if you look at the pattern of
who has settled and who has not settled, thinking again of some of the
universities against whom demands have been made, some of this
responds to the question that Professor Ghosh raised at the end, which
is to what extent will we have any right, at the end-user level, of personal
noncommercial use of some of this material?  In other words, part of
the question that’s being held out in common in all these cases is, what
are the rights of end-users with respect to material that they find on the
Internet?  That’s a big unknown at this point.
As you see the settlements fall into place, I think you’re starting to see
a trend counter to a right of general personal noncommercial use of
this material.  Rather, the fact that some of the universities in this
context have taken a position that they will not terminate academic or
student access to this service means that academic or scholarly use is an
area where we may see more emphasis placed in the context of the
fair-use doctrine as a particular gloss on, or application of, fair-use
rights.
MR. MCCULLAGH:  So, we’ve heard about two lawsuits that are at
least being negotiated or settled.  There’s a third lawsuit which is the
case brought by, I think, eight motion picture studios against 2,600
magazine, in the Southern District of New York;11 I was up there

11. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding that the promulgation of “DeCSS” decryption software violated the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
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covering it, of course, Judge Kaplan was presiding, and no settlement
there.
The case, for those of you who haven’t followed it, is a bunch of
European hackers, largely in their teens who, created a program or
were working on a program to allow people in the Linux community to
view DVDs, and that meant doing some reverse engineering, that
meant, arguably, violating the DMCA by publishing something that
would let them do so.  The system that’s used to scramble DVDs is
called CSS.  Their program was called DCSS for D or undoing, and the
2600 magazine, a hacker quarterly, published this program on their
website.  They got sued.  They lost at the district court level and that’s
ongoing.  They’re not going to settle.  Eric Corley, someone I know, has
no intention of settling with what he views as his archenemy, the motion
picture industry.
More importantly, these eight movie studio lawsuits against Corley
have had little, if any, effect except to popularize this technology.  DCSS
has become so widespread that you have hackers, marching with large
DCSS signs outside the courthouse.  You have them giving it to people
on flyers, when they’re walking into the building.
They put it on t-shirts, this is all over the place.  So there’s no central
distribution point for the lawyers to go after, it’s mirrored in thousands
of places around the that are on the Internet.  So, we also heard about
digital distribution technologies, like the DVD scrambling system and
SDMI.  There’s a problem for intellectual-property protectionists.  You
can’t protect content on insecure hardware.
Even on supposedly secure hardware, there might be flaws, there
might be bugs, it may not be successful.  The enemy of
intellectual-property protectionists is the general-purpose PC.  I mean,
this is what Apple Computer popularized in the 1970s and what we use
today on Windows’ laptops and what not.
You can take it apart, you can install a debugger, you can go through
every memory location, you can view what programs are running, you
can extract whatever data you want and dump it to a file.  This means,
there’s no good way-you can make it difficult but against a determined
hacker there’s no way that you can adequately protect information on a
general-purpose PC.  So that means going to secure hardware.  That
means, maybe, an ebook or ibook or something like a palm that’s
secure and protected and you can’t take apart.
Of course, if you thought Windows, PCs, were the enemy of
intellectual-property protectionists, there’s Linux, which was designed
from the get-go to be open-source and, therefore, impossible.  You can’t
even create something that’s difficult, in terms of an intellectual
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property you can’t copy the scheme, it’s just plain impossible, since
everything is open-source.  I’ll leave it at that.
MR. SCHALESTOCK:  This being Washington, D.C., I feel like I’d
be remiss if I didn’t make this point, that it’s not only that litigation has
become a standard part of doing business in the United States, which
we’ve certainly seen in this case but, also, lobbying has become just part
of the negotiations that go on between businesses and another way of
gaining some advantage in those negotiations.  I’ve seen this specifically
in this situation, where Internet companies and particularly ones that
are dealing with distribution of music over the Internet, have gone to
Congress and have asked in so many words that their business model be
exempted from copyright obligations under the law.  The recording
industry and other copyright holders have gone to Congress and asked
that the copyright law be revised to specifically state that these business
models are subject to copyright protection.  So, there are some very
explicit negotiations going on in the public policy realm, as well as the
courts.
The other point I wanted to make, getting back to this issue of the
fair-use aspects of the copyright law and the impacts of the new
technology on them, there has always been a degree of leakage in
copyright protection; some of it formally recognized in the form of
fair-use, some of it not recognized under the law, but simply accepted as
a matter of course and the compilation tapes of music recordings that
you make for yourself or give to a friend are a great example that
record companies know it goes on.  They know it’s technically against
the law, but it’s not really worth the time or effort to try and enforce it.
What’s happening now, with this newer technology, is that that
leakage has gone from a slow trickle to Niagara Falls.  This impacts the
notion of social norms, because what may have been acceptable as a
social norm before now, suddenly, becomes of such a large volume that
it simply can’t be tolerated as a business matter and, therefore, the
social norms either have to change or the business has to change
significantly to recognize them.
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  That’s an empirical question.  I don’t know
whether it’s on a larger scale than it was before.  The assumption is that
since technology makes copying easier, more people will start to
infringe or more copies will be made by current infringers.  I don’t
know whether that’s factually true or not.  The answer will depend
upon how one defines the market with its own set of norms and
institutional structure.  Of course, that raises burden of proof issues.
Section 107 is an affirmative defense, which means that the alleged
infringer bears the ultimate burden of proof.  But there is still the
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question of who bears the burden of production on market effects,
especially on the crucial question of what is the market.  Furthermore,
even under Section 107, there would have to be some sort of estoppel
or reliance to protect certain uses.
I think there is a problem under Section 107 to say that the right to
distribute doesn’t mean markets you have already entered, but any
possible market, even those you have not entered.  The MyMP3.com
opinion basically gives the copyright owner the right to pre-empt
markets from emerging, and that seems over broad.  Perhaps that is the
antitrust lawyer in me speaking, but such a broad reading is inconsistent
with copyright law, and intellectual property law more broadly.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  The empirical issue is interesting for another
reason, I think.  I have not heard in the debate on fair-use any attempt
to go back to first principles, and I would be curious to hear particularly
Professor Ghosh’s view on this, because I think that, if you look at the
purpose of the fair-use doctrine, if you look at the statute itself, 17
U.S.C. § 107, it focuses on things like criticism and social commentary,
news reporting, teaching, those kinds of uses.
If you look at the legislative history to the fair-use section, it expressly
states that its purpose is to foster creativity and to allow for small
exceptions to the underlying copyright principles so that creativity is
not stifled.  It really contemplates that the fair-use use of copyrighted
materials is, itself, a creative function that helps the overall discourse.
That’s what I don’t think has been discussed in this case, because I
don’t see that present at all in consumers downloading prepackaged
music.  There’s no exchange of ideas, there’s no debate, there’s no
discourse, they’re just taking stuff in my view.  I’d be interested in
Professor Ghosh’s view on that.
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  I think that’s what makes it hard.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  I mean, do you want to respond to it?
PROFESSOR MADISON:  That argument, actually, was made in
the Sony litigation, itself.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  Right.
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  The movie studios in that case made the
argument that when people are sitting at home time-shifting with their
VCRs, they are not making a creative or, in the language of the day, a
productive use of the  copyrighted material.  Although it was a very, very
close question, the majority of the court ruled that in those
circumstances it could be a fair use, even though it was not necessarily a
productive one.  So, I agree with you that this is still a live issue in the
new context and the new technology that we have today.  But it is not
settled as a matter of first principles that creative or productive reuse is
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required in order to find fair use.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  Yes.  I’m just saying that the issue has come up
and it’s not a settled issue.
PROFESSOR GOSH:  You get into a circularity problem in terms of
figuring out what is creative because, of course, Napster, itself, is the
product of a creative effort.  I couldn’t have done what that genius
Fannin did.  Admittedly, there are negative sides to it, but how you
determine what is creative or productive is so value-laden, while looking
at market effects is potentially objective.  The market effect analysis is
precluded by the broad readings of market in Section 107.
PROFESSOR MADISON:  As a matter of protection of creative works
in terms of whether they are copyrightable to begin with, we impose
such a low threshold of creativity at the front-end, it seems inconsistent,
at least to me, to impose a higher threshold of creativity to determine
whether something is a fair use subsequently.
MR. BAND:  I think it’s almost just a follow-on, I mean, there seem to
be, in the cases two strains to the fair-use doctrine; one is some of the
transformative use, but that seems to be, when you’re dealing with a
situation where a person is making a copy and then disseminates it to
the world.  So, for example, a parody that you market it, whether even a
scholarly work, that is, you quote from something, but then you sell it to
the world.  So, then, whether it’s commercial or not commercial is
another issue but, certainly, if you’re going to be redisseminating it to
the world, then you need to have that transformative aspect, that seems
to be my view of the case.
On the other hand, there is this other strain of fair-use, which really is
private copying, which goes to what you were talking about.  Now, the
tension with Napster, what makes Napster hard is that it seems to be
private copying, but in a public context.  And that’s why it doesn’t fit;
it’s not like the simple Sony case or the simpler Sony case, where people
were just sitting in their own home and they were copying it off of the
authorized broadcast over the airwaves, because here the sharing is
going on in a very public manner, and so that’s why Napster doesn’t fit
neatly into these two historic strains of the affeerors doctrine.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  Yes, and for that reason, I’d be interested in
elaboration of Professor Ghosh’s earlier comment about a safe harbor
notion for noncommercial use.  I think you posited a safe harbor
notion for noncommercial use by end-users, something like that?
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  Right, right.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  What are you conceiving of as being use?  Does
use include, essentially, distribution of the type that is involved in a
Napster-type system?
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PROFESSOR GHOSH:  I think it really depends upon what kind of
markets are being affected.  The question becomes an empirical one,
not necessarily in the statistical sense, but in the sense of creating a
factual record of the substantial effects of Napster.  Those are the
facts on which the contributory infringement claim should hinge.  So,
as Mr. Band has suggested, there probably is piracy going on through
Napster.  There’s probably also a lot of fair use, and it’s a factual
question as to what dominates at this point.
MR. LAUGHLIN:  But the problem is that we are not clearly
distinguishing between the commercial value of a product and how
society chooses to protect it.  First as simply the naked taking of the
product in the transfer.  I mean, it’s easy enough to say, well, it allows
file-sharing and, therefore, if I can give you a disc with a file on it, that
ought to be permissible because it is personal, private conduct between
agreeable individuals.
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  Right.
MR. LAUGHLIN:  It’s another thing, it seems to me, to set up a
whole regimen of interconnections through people who have no
contact with one another except for the fact that they are tied to the
same network and allow them to take this industrial property just
because it’s a file.
PROFESSOR GHOSH:  My response to that is, why?  All the Internet
does is expand the community.  Instead of file sharing with people in
your dorm, block, or high school class, you can share with people across
the country.  I do not see how that affects the fairness of the use—
except for a Section 107, hurting the market analysis.  No one has
demonstrated those market effects except for the argument that it is a
possible market, so it must be hurt.  The last argument does not seem
consistent with what the Supreme Court said in Sony, where they clearly
said, it’s actual markets, not potential markets.  Granted, that was a 5 to
4 decision.  It could have gone the other way.  If the Supreme Court
hears the Napster case, it may go the other way and we may see some
further legal analysis of the Section 107 market effects issue.  But I think
the law clearly is saying you look at actual market effects, and I have not
seen much evidence of any yet.
MR. MCCULLAGH:  I might be the only non-lawyer on the panel,
which puts me in an interesting position.  I’m sitting here listening to
lawyers debate the nuances of copyright law and the numbers and
emanations or whatever else.  It must be like hearing legislators and
politicians a hundred years ago debating the nuances of prohibition:
how it’s going to apply, what the exemptions are going to be, and how
this is going to play out in the courts.
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It is very difficult and I think the country figured it out to prohibit
people from engaging in consensual transactions, especially in the
privacy of their own homes or communities.  This is essentially what
intellectual property law tries to do.  I don’t think it’s going to work very
well, if we extrapolate current trends, whether it would be a
McCullagh’s law or what not.  Part of the problem is that copyright law
in the lay person’s view, relied in large part on the difficulty of making
copies.  Books, videotapes, CDs, it’s a pain to copy these things and not
so, on line.
There’s another problem for intellectual property law is that it just
takes one country to be a safe haven for IP anarchists or IP reductionists
instead of protectionists.  There’s a very interesting project called
HavenCo, which is based on an abandoned gun platform off the coast
of the UK.  Supposedly, they claim, and there’s some opinion saying
this, that it’s outside the reach of UK law.  There are some Indian
reservations who also want to be havens for Internet anarchy.  There are
going to be intellectual property havens, intellectual property anarchists
who will hang out there, and they’ll make plenty of money selling IP to
people if there’s a market demand. I expect there will be.  So, I’m not
sure if law’s going to be all that relevant if, again, if we extrapolate
current trends.
PROFESSOR GOSH:  Just to follow from that, before, you were
mentioning how and you were saying, well, the PC is the
content-provider’s worst enemy.  Well, I would suggest, in many cases,
the content-provider’s worst enemy is the content- provider.
In many instances they just have not been flexible enough or quick
enough.  Instead, they have tried to rely on litigation and legislation to
protect market share, as opposed to saying, how do we just keep on
moving, running faster and jumping higher to keep our market share?
You really say, well, why does Napster have 40 million subscribers?  Why
doesn’t Sony have a service that works like that?  Why doesn’t BMG, why
didn’t they come up with that idea themselves?  Essentially you see that
the Sony model, the Sony website, I mean, is charging $2 per download.
Well, duh, I mean, who’s going to go there and pay $2 to hear, to get a
song when you can get a lot more on Napster.  So, again, it’s just a
question of, I think, the content-providers, again.  It’s too easy, in many
contexts, and this goes to your antitrust fund it’s too easy, when you’re
in a dominant position to rely on litigation and legislation instead of on
competition and innovation.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  I would like to intervene here because
there is a question from the audience that is relevant to our current
discussion.  The question is:  “Large popular bands, like Metallica, have
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the power to demand their own contractual clauses, whereas 95 percent
of musical artists do not.  Isn’t the recording industry just a middle-man
trying to extend its monopoly and retard innovation in the
informational commons?”  Anyone . . .
MR. BORKOWSKI:  I’m not going to answer that because I’m
involved in a litigation.
MR. BAND:  The court, I mean, the judge, had a pretty easy answer
to that question, saying Napster has an area for new artists.  She said
they could have just had its new artists area and shut the rest of it down.
So, Napster could have a market model—just a Napster service, which is
really oriented only towards new bands.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  How many people would visit that site?
MR. BAND:  But then the point is that what’s really driving it is not
the new bands and people without recording contracts, but what really
is driving the traffic is Metallica.  So, the premise of the question, then,
is undermined.
MR. BORKOWSKI:  I have question about what you said a little
earlier though, just a moment before this question.  But it is related in
that, I think, one of the reasons that the industry has taken a while—
and it actually isn’t a while in real time, it is a while in Internet time—
to get to where it is right now is because it doesn’t have the luxury of
what Napster has, which is not to worry about security, content
ownership, or the payment of royalties.  For example, the industry has
been trying to solve the problem of developing secure formats for
distribution, so that its crown jewels, essentially, don’t get dissipated and
lose their value.
Napster didn’t have to worry about that and the developers of these
other technologies don’t want to have to worry about that.  The
undercurrents you hear, even on this panel, from people more on that
side of the fence, is that, well, law-schmaw, who cares?  The industry just
cares about profits.  It’s all about the technology and the law’s a
dinosaur and we don’t want to pay attention to it.  Certainly, the
content owners don’t have that luxury and that’s one of the reasons it’s
taking them a little while to get to an acceptable place.
MR. LAUGHLIN:  I thought I heard an implied criticism in that
question.  The criticism being that all of this is simply being focused on
the distribution industry and really has nothing to do with the creators
of the content who we wish to reward through the copyright system.
But that kind of begs the question in a way, because you have to, at least
pre-Napster, pre-new technology, have methods of distribution.
A band, even Metallica, could not get the appreciation in society that
it has without the distribution scheme in place.  The problem is, today,
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of course, that the new technologies are attacking the old methods of
distribution.  The question is, why aren’t the old methods of
distribution nimble and quick on their feet?  The answer is because the
old methods are never nimble and quick on their feet, it is only the
young that prance and run quickly.
PROFESSOR MADISON:  I would like to respond to another thing
that I think is underneath the surface of the question there, and I think
it echoes something that Declan mentioned in the context of the
relationship among all of these issues for lay people or non-lawyers.
Not only does the lawyering matter, which is the comment I made at
the outset, but the rhetoric matters as well.  One of the problems that
we are seeing now in the application of copyright law to the Internet is
we are no longer comfortable with what some of the words mean.  If
you go back across some of the comments that you have heard on the
panel, you have heard words such as use or user, public and private,
commercial and noncommercial, file-sharing, the language that you see
in some of the filings and even in some of the language of the reported
decisions about piracy and theft.  In the Metallica complaint against
Napster, counsel characterize college students as common looters.
The rhetorical battle and the definitional battle make a big
difference here.  I think it is a big source of the confusion and
ambiguity in how the different sides to these cases understand how the
law should apply and how they are trying to shape public perception of
what is appropriate.
Part of the rhetorical battle is, is this really litigation about artists and
creative people and their rights to be fairly compensated for what they
do, or is this just the “big bad corporations” trying selfishly to keep
more of a new pile of money for themselves?  People have different
answers to that question in good faith, but I think that it is part of the
dynamic that is getting played out in the different lawsuits.
PROFESSOR FARLEY:  Thank you.  Regrettably, I must cut it off
here.  I do want to thank the panel.  It has been very interesting and
informative, and has nicely led into the discussion for the next panel.
We will now take a 15-minute break and panel two will begin at 11:00
o’clock.  Thank you very much.
 (WHEREUPON, A RECESS WAS TAKEN).
* * * * *
